Establishing Rules for Resolving Markman Failures
Ian A. Lamplt
In Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc,' the Federal Circuit
held that the scope of patent claims was a matter of law entirely
within the domain of the courts The decision also provided the analytical framework for claim construction While Markman detailed
this framework for construing patent claims, later courts were left to
determine what default rule should apply when the Markman analysis
fails. This Comment specifically addresses an apparent conflict within
Federal Circuit case law concerning the best way to construe patents
when the Markman analysis fails to do so conclusively.
The Markman framework for analyzing patents mirrors that of
statutory interpretation.' The framework is multitiered, first separating
intrinsic evidence from extrinsic, and then further specifying the use
and ordering of intrinsic evidence.5 In determining the evidence intrinsic to the patent, the court "consider[s] three sources: The claims, the
specification, and the prosecution history."6 This establishes both the
relative importance and order of analysis for the intrinsic evidence. In
determining the scope of a patent, the claims are treated similarly to a
I

B.S.E. 2002, Princeton University; J.D. 2005, The University of Chicago.
52 F3d 967 (Fed Cir 1995), affd, 517 US 370 (1996).
2
Markman, 52 F3d at 977-78 (holding that the "construction of a written evidence is
exclusively with the court"), quoting Levy v Gadsby, 7 US 180,186 (1805).
3 See Markman, 52 F3d at 979-81 (explaining that a court should rely on the intrinsic
evidence of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history when construing claims and
should only turn to extrinsic evidence to supplement the intrinsic evidence).
4
The Markman court found:
1

The more appropriate analogy for interpreting patent claims is the statutory interpretation
analogy. ... There can be only one correct interpretation of a statute that applies to all persons. Statutes are written instruments that all persons are presumed to be aware of and are
bound to follow.
Id at 987, citing United States v John C. Grimberg Co, 702 F2d 1362, 1365, 1368 (Fed Cir 1983).
5
See Pavan K. Agarwal, Patenting in Line with the Federal Circuit, 12 Fed Cir Bar J 395,
396 (2002-2003).
6
Markman, 52 F3d at 979. The contents of a patent application must include a specification as prescribed by 35 USC § 111(a)(2) (2000). Section 112 details:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it,... and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention. The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
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statute's enacted language, with the specification providing some initial context and the prosecution history aiding claim construction
much as legislative history informs statutory interpretation. Next, the
court considers the extrinsic evidence, which consists of "all evidence
external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and
inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises."7 Courts interpreting the meaning and scope of patent claims use these sources of
intrinsic and then extrinsic evidence combined with relevant canons of
construction to construe the claims in dispute. However, due to the
nature of litigation, the court's role in determining the scope of a patent is usually limited to selecting between the competing meanings
proffered by the opposing parties.!
To adjudicate the suit, a court need only determine which of the
two proffered definitions to accept. The patent holder offers a definition that includes the adverse party's product, and the adverse party
offers a definition that excludes her product. ' Because the result of
litigation is either infringement or noninfringement (that is, the result
is binary), any additional definition provided by the court is irrelevant
as it will either be inclusive or exclusive of the adverse party's product." If a proffered definition fails to satisfy any part of the Markman
analysis, it fails as a viable definition, and the other definition must
prevail. However, the question remains: how should the Federal Circuit determine the scope of a patent where both proffered definitions
satisfy the entire Markman analysis? Either rule forces the court to
choose between two competing and equally plausible definitions,
thereby creating a windfall for the winning party.
While the Federal Circuit has established rules for resolving
Markman failures, it has done so in a confusing, piecemeal fashion. In
fact, Federal Circuit case law seems to support both a broad productinclusive and a narrow product-exclusive rule of construction. In Athletic
Alternatives Inc v Prince Manufacturing,Inc'2 ("AAI"), the court held:
Where there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that
Markman, 52 F3d at 980.
8 See Douglas Y'Barbo, InterpretingWords in a Patent, 1 Chi Kent J Intel Prop 191, 192
(1999) ("The trial court's only task is to answer that binary question; it cannot, regardless of what
it does, supplement that result.").
9 See id ("There is no point seeking a finer distinction that the end result permits. Therefore, claim construction should not be an unbounded search for the disputed term's meaning but
instead a rational process of selection from between the two proffered alternatives.").
10 See id.
11 See id. Third parties to the action may have a strong interest in alternative claim con7

structions, but the magnitude of that interest is limited by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
12 73 F3d 1573 (Fed Cir 1996).
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indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having
the narrower meaning, we consider the notice function of the
claim to be best served by adopting the narrowermeaning."

However, other decisions by the Federal Circuit adopt a productinclusive rule of construction." Facing two equally plausible definitions in Rexnord Corp v Laitram Corp," the court noted that "we may

presume that the examiner gave the terms in the proposed claim their
'broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification,'
since he was obliged to do so. ' 16 This rule of construction was later
adopted by the more often-cited case of Texas DigitalSystems, Inc v

Telegenix, Inc," which stated that "[i]f more than one dictionary definition is consistent with the use of the words in the intrinsic record, the
claim terms may be construed to encompass all such consistent mean-

ings."'
The Federal Circuit has not addressed the conflicting rules of
construction established by Rexnord and AAL Only one Federal Cir-

cuit case cites both Rexnord and AAI, but the court does not attempt
to clarify how the two cases interact.19 Additionally, three cases cite
both Texas Digital and AAI, but none of those cite Texas Digital and
AAI for their opposing rules of construction.0 As such, the Federal

Id at 1581 (emphasis added). See also Housey Pharmaceuticals,Inc v Astrazeneca UK
13
Ltd, 366 F3d 1348, 1356 (Fed Cir 2004), cert denied, 125 S Ct 973 (2005) ("In that unusual case
[AAI], one patent applicant made two contradictory and irreconcilableaffirmative representations of the contested limitation. In those circumstances, we held that the narrower interpretation trumps the broader interpretation.").
14
See, for example, InternationalRectifier Corp v IXYS Corp, 361 F3d 1363, 1374 (Fed Cir
2004) (finding a broad definition of the term "adjoining"). Other district court rulings have also
followed the product-inclusive definition. See, for example, Gleason Works v Oerlikon Geartec
AG, 238 F Supp 2d 504,509-10 (WD NY 2002).
15 274 F3d 1336 (Fed Cir 2001).
16
Id at 1347, quoting Hyatt v Boone, 146 F3d 1348, 1355 (Fed Cir 1998).
308 F3d 1193 (Fed Cir 2002).
17
18 Id at 1203, citing Rexnord, 274 F3d at 1343.
19 See Housey, 366 F3d at 1352, 1356 (citing Rexnord for the proposition that the meaning
of a claim term must be considered in the context of the specification and prosecution history,
and AAI for the proposition that the narrower meaning trumps the broader when there are two
contradictory and irreconcilable plausible meanings for a claim term).
See id at 1352, 1356 (citing Texas Digital for the proposition that "[d]ictionaries and
20
treatises may provide insight into a term's ordinary meaning," and AAI for the proposition that
the narrower meaning trumps the broader when there are two contradictory and irreconcilable
plausible meanings for a claim term); Novartis PharmaceuticalsCorp v Abbott Laboratories,375
F3d 1328, 1334, 1337-38 (Fed Cir 2004) (citing Texas Digitalfor the presumption that a patent
term has the meaning that a person of ordinary skill in the art would ordinarily attribute to it,
and AAI concerning the doctrine of equivalents); Liquid Dynamics Corp v Vaughn Co, Inc, 355
F3d 1361, 1366, 1368 (Fed Cir 2004) (citing Texas Digital for the proposition that the written
description and the prosecution history cannot be used to reject the plain meaning when it is
clear, and AAI for a proposition of prosecution history estoppel).
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Circuit has never had occasion to decide whether the two rules are in
conflict or, if there is no conflict, to explain the proper nonconflicting
application of the two rules.2'
This Comment reconciles these two inconsistent rules of construction by arguing that each rule applies to a distinguishable set of
factual circumstances. By applying the two rules in this fashion, the
Federal Circuit can promote the patent system's goals more effectively than adopting either rule alone. Part I discusses the cases that
led to the adoption of each rule and resolves the apparent conflict by
presenting the factual circumstances under which each rule should
govern. Part II discusses the principle of construction that underpins
these two rules and provides the appropriate framework for analyzing
the costs and benefits these rules present to the patent system. Finally,
Part III demonstrates why this Comment's resolution of these ruleshighlighting their complementary functions-promotes a more effective patent system.
I. FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASE LAW CONCERNING MARKMAN FAILURES

A. The Product-Exclusive Rule of Construction
AAI concerned a dispute over tennis racket technology. Originally, the litigants entered into a joint venture to develop a new type
of tennis racket that presented splayed strings. 2 However, when the
two companies were unable to reach a licensing agreement, Prince
entered the market with an alternative design and Athletic Alternatives asserted infringement. 24
At trial, the parties disagreed solely on the issue of claim construction,2 specifically, over the definition of the phrase "varies between. ' 6 The Federal Circuit's opinion provides a clear framework for
the disagreement:
AAI contends, citing a number of dictionary definitions of "between" in its favor, that "the plain meaning of the words 'varies
between minimums ... and a maximum' is that the distance of
string splay must change ... [but] nothing in Claim 1 prescribes
21 See Newell Companies, Inc v Kenney Manufacturing Co, 864 F2d 757,765 (Fed Cir 1988)
("[P]rior decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless and
until overturned in banc.").
22
73 F3d 1573.
23 Idat 1574.
24
Id at 1574-75.
25 Id at 1578 ("[Tjhe parties do not dispute any relevant facts regarding the accused product but disagree over which of the two possible meanings of Claim 1 is the proper one.").
26
Id.
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(or limits) how much or how many times the distance must
change." Prince, for its part, cites alternative and equally valid
dictionary definitions of "between" in an effort to demonstrate
that the trial court properly construed the claim to require that
the offset distance d, take on at least three values, i.e., a minimum,
a maximum, and at least one intermediate value."
After an exhaustive analysis utilizing the entire gamut of the Markman framework the court concluded, "Neither the claim, the specification, nor the prosecution history establishes the meaning of the phrase
'varies between' in Claim V.8 The disputed phrase presented "two
equally plausible meanings." 9 Faced with these two plausible definitions, the court held against the patent holder and for the adverse
party. The AAI court, therefore, established a failure default rule accepting the narrow, product-exclusive definition."
The Federal Circuit based its holding in AAI on the patent system's policy of fair notice." The court relied upon § 112 of the Patent
Act, which requires that "[t]he specification shall conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 2 As the AAI
court and other courts have recognized, "[Slince the requirement that
one's invention be distinctly claimed became part of the patent law in
1870, the primary purpose of the requirement is 'to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others
arising from uncertainty as to their [respective] rights.' 3 The AAI
court's analysis found a statutory duty to resolve uncertainty in defining patent claims in favor of the narrow meaning; namely if it were to
accept "the broader of the two [definitions, the court] would undermine the fair notice function of the requirement that the patentee distinctly claim the subject matter disclosed in the patent from which he
can exclude others temporarily." The Federal Circuit seemed to sugId at 1579 (internal citations omitted).
Id at 1580.
29
Idat 1581.
30
Id.
31 See id ("[W]e consider the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the
narrower meaning."). See also Northern Telecom Ltd v Samsung Electronics Co, Ltd, 215 F3d
1281, 1295 (Fed Cir 2000) ("When presented with the situation where two clear yet contradictory
definitions are provided by the patentee, we stated that this court would choose the narrower of
the two, as such a practice would 'best serve[]' the notice function of the claim."), citing AAI, 73
F3d at 1581.
32 35 USC § 112.
33 AAI, 73 F3d at 1581, quoting General Electric Co v Wabash Appliance Corp, 304 US 364,
369 (1938).
34 AAI, 73 F3d at 1581.
27

28
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gest that when facing two equally plausible definitions, it must limit
the scope of the patent to enforce upon the patent holder the statutory obligation of fair notice.
B.

The Product-Inclusive Rule of Construction
Rexnord Corp v Laitram Corp concerns a dispute over conveyor

technology in the bottling and packaging industry." Specifically, Rexnord Corporation was the holder of U.S. Patent 5,634,550 ("the '550
patent"), which describes a novel manner in which to "transfer articles
between an upstream conveyor and a downstream conveyor oriented
at ninety-degree angles with respect to each other,"36 so that the last
row of cans or bottles can be transferred or cleared automatically
without manual intervention. The innovation of the '550 patent was
the use of interlinking "chain links" together with "chain pins," where
"[t]he 'chain links' have two portions: (1) a 'link module portion' and
(2) a 'cantilevered portion.' ' Rexnord filed an infringement action
against Laitram for its manufacture and sale of the conveyor system
named "ONE PIECE Live Transfer Belt," where it was undisputed
that the "conveyor belts contain[] chain links having a one-piece construction, that is, the link module portion and the cantilevered portion
are of one piece. ' ' 9
The case turned on the construction of the word "portion" as
used in the '550 patent, and, as always, the court had to determine the
proper definition from the two competing definitions proffered by the
litigants.4° The court stated the issue as follows: "The dispositive question in this case is whether the word 'portion' as used in the claims of
the '550 patent should be limited to parts of an object that are 'sepa-1
rate,' as opposed to parts that can be either 'separate' or 'integral.''
After an examination of both the claims and the specification, the
court concluded, "When the claim language is assessed on its own, and
when the written description is examined carefully, one finds that the
patentee has described an invention that embraces, through the word
274 F3d at 1339.
Id.
37
Id. The previous solution to the problem was to use a metal transfer plate where each
row of cans was pushed off the plate onto the downstream conveyor by the next row of cans.
"Hence, when using a transfer plate, the last row of cans or bottles had to be pushed manually
onto the downstream conveyor." Id.
38
Id at 1339-40.
39 Id at 1340.
40 See id at 1341 ("Rexnord contends that the broader interpretation should be adopted.
Not surprisingly, Laitram argues that the narrower interpretation requiring separate parts should
prevail.").
41 Id.
35

36
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'portion,' [a] structure that may be either 'integral' or 'separate.'''4
Moreover, the court found the prosecution history to be "inconclusive

regarding the proper interpretation of the word 'portion.' ' , 3 As with
the AAI court, the Rexnord court found that the Markman framework

failed to establish a single viable definition.4 Faced with this failure of
the Markman analysis, the Federal Circuit declared that it must find
for Rexnord, creating a different failure default rule whereby the

court was "obliged to give 'portion' the broader interpretation that
encompasses both 'separate' and 'integral' parts of the invention."'"
The basis for the Federal Circuit's holding in Rexnord was the obligations of the patent examiner rather than those of the patent
holder, as in AAI' Simply stated, "we may presume that the examiner
gave the terms in the proposed claim their 'broadest reasonable inter-

pretation consistent with the specification,' since he was obliged to do
so."' The Federal Circuit reasoned that if the patent examiner must
afford each claim term the broadest possible meaning prior to the
grant, then a court could not erroneously enlarge the scope of the pat-

ent during adjudication." This suggests that a court must accept the
broader of the definitions proffered unless specifically and explicitly
disclaimed. 9 The scope of the patent must include all possible defini-

42

Id at 1345. Compare AAI,73 F3d at 1579:

In sum, the dispositive claim language on its face is susceptible to two equally plausible
meanings, under one of which the Vortex racket literally infringes Claim 1, and under the
other of which it does not. As a result, the scope of Claim 1 cannot be defined by resort to
the ordinary and accustomed meanings of its terms alone, and the specification is completely silent with regard to the meaning of "varies between."
43 Rexnord, 274 F3d at 1347. Compare AAI, 73 F3d at 1580 ("The prosecution in this case
is thus unhelpful as an interpretive resource for construing the 'varies between' claim linitation.").
44 Rexnord, 274 F3d at 1345 ("[O]ne finds that the patentee has described an invention
that embraces, through the word 'portion,' [a] structure that may be either 'integral' or 'separate."'); AA1, 73 F3d at 1581 ("[W]e are left with two equally plausible meanings of Claim 1.").
45
Rexnord, 274 F3d at 1348 (emphasis added).
46 See id at 1347 ("Given the examiner's obligation to confer the broadest reasonable
interpretation ....).
47 Id, quoting Hyatt v Boone, 146 F3d 1348, 1355 (Fed Cir 1998). See also Manual of Patent
Examination Procedures § 2111 ("Applicant always has the opportunity to amend the claims
during prosecution and broad interpretation by the examiner reduces the possibility that the
claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified.").
48 See In re Yamamoto, 740 F2d 1569, 1571 (Fed Cir 1984) (stating that requiring the examiner to provide the broadest possible definition prior to the grant "serves the public interest by
reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified").
49
See Rexnord, 274 F3d at 1348 ("The fact that the patentee did not explicitly disclose a
one-piece embodiment in the specification or that the examiner failed to require an illustration
of a one-piece construction is not enough to import a 'separate' limitation from the specification
into the claims.") (emphasis added).
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tions that do not invalidate it because the patent examiner is obligated
to give the terms their broadest possible meaning when granting the
patent.'°
Interestingly, this reasoning also invokes fair notice principles.
Fair notice is established during the prosecution of the patent when
terms are given their broadest meaning. In order to survive the examination process, the applicant must disclaim any meaning that
would cause invalidation. Thus, the patent grant would necessarily put
all parties on notice since the scope of the patent would encompass
any and all meanings that a party might perceive.
C.

Contrasting the Product-Inclusive Rule with the
Product-Exclusive Rule

The Rexnord court seemed to require a broad interpretive rule
that is contrary to the earlier AAI rule of narrow construction. Again,
either rule of construction forces the court to decide between two
equally plausible definitions, granting a windfall to the winning party.
Because neither the Rexnord nor the AAI court provided any substantive or even procedural distinction between these rules, the Federal
Circuit has left lower courts without guidance in selecting one rule
over the other.
There are several plausible reasons why the Federal Circuit has
not attempted to reconcile the two rules. First, Markman rarely fails to
provide a prevailing definition.51 Markman is an intensive analysis, and
it is rare that both parties could present opposing definitions satisfying
all of the Markman requirements. Second, Rexnord and Texas Digital

are often cited for other propositions of law, but rarely cited for their
product-inclusive rule of claim construction. 2 In fact, Rexnord is usually cited for its holding concerning the proper use of intrinsic evidence
interpret
patent,"definitions
and TexasasDigital
for its
concerningtothe
use of the
dictionary
evidence
of holding
the ordinary

50 See id at 1347 ("[I]f the examiner wanted to hinge patentability upon the [narrower
definition] he would have said so, and required a specific amendment to reflect [that decision].").
51 See, for example, Housey Pharmaceuticals,Inc v Astrazeneca UK Ltd, 366 F3d 1348,1356
(Fed Cir 2004) (noting that AAI is an "unusual case"). Interestingly, litigants also find it difficult
to understand the rule of construction presented by AAL See id ("Housey misreads Athletic
Alternatives."); Northern Telecom, 215 F3d at 1295 ("This is a misreading of Athletic Alternatives.").
52 See note 20.
53 See, for example, Housey, 366 F3d at 1352 ("However, a claim must also be considered
in the context of the intrinsic evidence, namely the claims, the specification, and the prosecution
history."), citing Rexnord, 274 F3d at 1342-43.
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meaning of claim terms. 4 Finally, claim construction, from the standpoint of interpretation, is similar to statutory construction. Karl Llewellyn noted in The Common Law Tradition that almost all canons of
statutory construction have conflicting rules." Thus, it should not be
surprising that the Federal Circuit would also have conflicting rules of
claim construction given the great similarity between the two tasks.
Notwithstanding the lack of attention surrounding this issue, the
interaction of the two rules needs to be analyzed and explained for
several reasons. First, the rules of construction presented by Rexnord
and AAI seem, upon initial inspection, to be in conflict. Second, and
most important, courts do continue to cite them, albeit rarely, for their
opposing rules of construction without reference to the other. For ex6
ample, InternationalRectifier Corp v IXYS Corp and Gleason Works
v Oerlikon GeartecAG" both quote Texas Digital's product-inclusive
rule of construction, whereas Housey Pharmaceuticals,Inc v Astrazeneca UK Ltd" cites AAI for its product-exclusive rule of construction. Without adequate guidance from the Federal Circuit, lower
courts may be applying the rules incorrectly -or worse, arbitrarily.
In resolving these conflicting rules of construction, the Federal
Circuit's rules governing conflicting decisions must be considered. In
the Federal Circuit, "prior decisions of a panel of the court are binding
precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned in banc.
9
Where there is direct conflict, the precedential decision is the first."
In light of such established rules, it is important to try to resolve these
different opinions in a manner that avoids conflict.
D.

Resolving the Conflict Between the Product-Inclusive and
Product-Exclusive Rules of Construction

While the AAI and Rexnord rules of construction seem to be in
conflict, more nuanced interpretations of these decisions may demon54 See, for example, Home Diagnostics, Inc v LifeScan, Inc, 381 F3d 1352, 1356 (Fed Cir
2004) ("Other useful references for construing disputed terms include dictionary definitions and
treatises."), citing Texas Digital,308 F3d at 1202.
55 Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 522-35 (Little, Brown
1960) (listing the canons of construction in thrust and parry format, demonstrating that almost
all canons of construction are at least facially in conflict with one another).
56
361 F3d 1363, 1374 (Fed Cir 2004) ("It is true that 'if more than one dictionary definition
is consistent with the use of the words in the intrinsic record, the claim terms may be construed
to encompass all such consistent meanings."'), quoting Texas Digital,308 F3d at 1203.
57 238 F Supp 2d 504,509 (WD NY 2002), quoting Texas Digital,308 F3d at 1203.
366 F3d 1348, 1356 (Fed Cir 2004) (noting that where two irreconcilable definitions are
58
proffered and there is "a tie" under the Markman analysis, AAI provides that the narrower
definition should be selected), citing AAI, 73 F3d at 1581.
59 Newell Companies, Inc v Kenney Manufacturing Co, 864 F2d 757, 765 (Fed Cir 1988)
(internal citations omitted).
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strate coherence. Given the workings of the Federal Circuit, it is important not only to avoid the conflict but to do so in a manner that
most effectively promotes the policy goals of the patent system. Neither AAI nor Rexnord expressly limit their holdings to a particular
type of competing definition (overlapping or nonoverlapping), yet
their respective holdings might be limited in such a way to minimize
conflict. Arguably, AAI may require choosing the narrower of the two
plausible definitions only when the definitions overlap. Rexnord, on
the other hand, may require accepting both plausible definitions only
when the definitions are nonoverlapping. To clarify, if the patent
holder proffers a definition of a term that consists of a range from 1 to
10 and the adverse party proffers a range from 1 to 5, AAI would require setting the scope of the patent to a range from 1 to 5 as the two
proffered definitions are overlapping." On the other hand, if the patent holder proffers a definition of a term that consists of a range from
1 to 10 and the adverse party proffers a range from 20 to 30, Rexnord
would require setting the scope of the patent to include both the
range from 1 to 10 and the range from 20 to 30. 61 Under such an interpretive regime, AAI and Rexnord are not in conflict because they apply to two distinguishable sets of circumstances.
Parts II and III of this Comment argue that Rexnord and AAI are
not, in fact, in conflict. Rather, when their rules work in tandem, they
promote the policies of the patent system more effectively than either
rule alone.
II. FAIR NOTICE, THE PATENT OFFICE, AND DRAFTING INCENTIVES

Evaluating each rule of construction requires applying the principle of fair notice to the practical constraints of patent drafting, the
interaction between the patent drafter and the patent office, and the
tactics of litigation. In the end, pragmatic considerations of fair notice
will control the proper application of each rule.
A. Fair Notice
The Federal Circuit has invoked "fair notice" as the analytical
mechanism to defend its decisions in both AAI and Rexnord.2 It is

60 The AAI court discusses an "equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of
a claim," which can occur only if the definitions overlap. AAI, 73 F3d at 1581 (emphasis added).
61 The Rexnord court's holding adopting both the separate and integral definition of the
claim term exemplifies a term with multiple nonoverlapping definitions, as the meaning of separate is clearly distinct from that of integral. See Rexnord, 274 F3d at 1347.
62 For AAI, see text accompanying notes 31-34; for Rexnord, see text accompanying notes
48-50.
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important to note however, that adopting any rule that (1) includes all
possible definitions, (2) limits to the more narrow definition, or (3)
excludes nonoverlapping definitions can satisfy the requirements of
fair notice, so long as the rule is clear and all parties have knowledge
of the rule ex ante.0 The Federal Circuit could satisfy its statutory obligation of providing fair notice by adopting any of the rules. Fair notice requires clarity but does not necessarily dictate any specific rule.
While both the AAI and Rexnord courts used the principle of fair notice as the foundation for their holdings, neither court explored what
fair notice requires in practice.
Fair notice is essential to a working patent system because it enables investment in developing both original innovation and workaround technologies." The United States patent system is based on the
policy rationale that in order to provide adequate incentives to invent,
the innovator must be given an exclusive property right for a "limited
time" in exchange for a full disclosure that enhances the public domain." If this picture is accurate, ex ante the government must be able
to provide a credible commitment to protect this exclusive property
right. As part of this credible commitment, the scope of patent claims
must be clearly delineated.6
63
See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L J 729,732 (1992):

This is what we characterize as our "irrelevance conjecture" -the choice of default becomes irrelevant when it is costless to contract and when the default rule is common
knowledge. Without these transaction costs (and when the default rule is common knowledge), strategic bargaining can still cause inefficient contracting, but the same contractual
equilibrium will be reached by private parties, regardless of the default rule.
64 See General Electric Co v Wabash Appliance Corp, 304 US 364, 369 (1938) ("The limits
of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately
to the public."); Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictabilityin Patent Litigation: The
Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J Intel Prop L 175, 176 (2001)
("Public policy requires that a patent owner clearly and explicitly notify the public of the scope
of the subject invention. The patent document itself should put the world on notice of the patent's boundaries.").
65
See US Const Art I, § 8, cI 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."). See also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex L Rev 989, 993 (1997) ("Intellectual property is fundamentally
about incentives to invent and create. While there are a number of noneconomic theories offered
to explain both copyright and patent law, both the United States Constitution and judicial decisions seem to acknowledge the primacy of incentive theory in justifying intellectual property.").
See R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: PatentAdministration and the Failure of
66
Festo, 151 U Pa L Rev 159,164-65 (2002):

A major concern in the modem patent system is uncertainty surrounding the ultimate coverage of a patent; that is, the relationship between invention, disclosure, and patent scope
that is at the core of the social compact of the patent system. Ambiguity in this context
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Imperfect demarcation of the scope of patents reduces the effectiveness of the patent system by reducing incentives to invent. Erroneously limiting the scope of a patent during adjudication reduces
incentives to invest in developing new technologies. 67 Erroneously
enlarging the scope of a patent during adjudication reduces the incentive to invest in work-around technologies. 6 Thus, providing fair notice
by accurately delineating the scope of the patent is essential to a
69
working patent system.
B.

The Patent Office

A rough review of the capabilities of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("Patent Office") is necessary to properly select the interpretive rule that most effectively promotes the policies of
the patent system. Rexnord defended its rule of construction on the
obligations of the patent examiner. Thus, the actual ability of the Patent Office to accurately and thoroughly review patent grants is vitally
important when determining which rule of construction best promotes
the policies of the patent system.
First, it is important to note who the Patent Office employs as
patent examiners. The basic qualification for examiners in any field is
simply a four-year science or engineering degree with either a grade
point average over a 2.66 out of a possible 4.0 or membership in a recmakes evaluating patentability difficult, undermines financial valuations, results in confusion concerning potential infringement, and requires costly ex post generation of information, often as part of litigation.
67 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U Chi L Rev 625, 633 (2002) (commenting that
under the rent-extracting theory of patents, the failure of the law to protect the rent-extracting
features of patents would cause a reduction in the number of patents sought).
68 See Markman, 517 US at 390 ("Otherwise, a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage invention
only a little less than unequivocalforeclosure of the field.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
69 See Rengo Co, Ltd v Molins Machine Co, Inc, 657 F2d 535,551 (3d Cir 1981):
Adequate description of the invention guards against the inventor's overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to
be encompassed within his original creation. The definiteness requirement shapes the future conduct of persons other than the inventor, by insisting that they receive notice of the
scope of the patented device.
The importance of demarcating the scope of the patent has long been understood: "As courts
have recognized since the requirement that one's invention be distinctly claimed became part of
the patent law in 1870, the primary purpose of the requirement is 'to guard against unreasonable
advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their
[respective] rights."' AA1, 73 F3d at 1581, quoting General Electric,304 US at 369. Moreover, the
likelihood of infringement increases as the uncertainty surrounding the property right increases.
See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property
Law 347 (Belknap 2003) ("Other things being equal, the more certain law is, the less likely is
litigation.").
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ognized honor society.0 Thus, most examiners will be young, recent
graduates of colleges and universities, and not fully experienced professionals.
Second, the examiner has limited time to review any single patent
application. A patent examiner will on average spend only eighteen

hours, over a two- to three-year period, reviewing a single patent."
Moreover, patents have, on average, approximately fifteen claims and

cite more than fifteen pieces of prior art. Thus, patent examiners are
limited in their ability not only to understand the technology of the
patent," but also to review all the language of the claims for vague or

ambiguous terms.
Finally, once a patent application has survived the prosecution
process, the patent holder receives procedural advantages in later adjudications concerning the patent. Once granted, a patent is presumed

valid,7 ' and to overcome that presumption, a party must prove the patent's invalidity by "clear and convincing evidence. ' 7 The deference
patents receive in adjudication, combined with the limited ability of the
Patent Office to review patents, creates perverse incentives for patent
drafters.
C. Patent Drafting Incentives
If the broad interpretive rule suggested by Rexnord is unconditionally accepted, the patent drafter, with knowledge of a broad rule,

is encouraged to leave critical terms vague to increase the likelihood
70 See Patent Examiner Qualifications,online at www.uspto.gov/web/officeslac/ahrpa/ohr/
jobs/qualifications.htm (visited May 19,2005).
71 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw U L Rev 1495, 1500
(2001) (suggesting that many patents issued by the Patent Office would have been rejected if the
examiners had spent more time researching and reviewing the applications).
72
See John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An EmpiricalExploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 Vand L Rev 2099, 2120 (2000) ("On average, each patent cited
10.34 prior U.S. patents, compared with only 2.44 foreign patents and 2.37 non-patent references.
Indeed, the median patent cited no non-patent prior art at all."). "Prior art" is a term of art in
patent law, and generally designates what is known in that subject area prior to the inventor's
invention. The rules concerning what is valid prior art are described in the Patent Act. 35 USC
§§ 102-03 (2000) (defining various categories of inventions as novel and nonobvious). See also
Jay P. Kesan, Carrotsand Sticks to Create a Better PatentSystem, 17 Berkeley Tech L J 763, 77071 (2002) ("This disclosure [of prior art in an application without description of that prior art] is
of limited assistance to the Patent Office because the patent examiner has the difficult task of
discerning what knowledge is buried in these references in order to appreciate the import of the
disclosed prior art.").
73 See Kesan, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 771-72 (cited in note 72) (noting that prior art disclosures are often inadequate due to private incentives, leaving the Patent Office ill-equipped to
determine the proper scope of the patent).
74 35 USC § 282 (2000). See also American Hoist & Derrick Co v Sowa & Sons, Inc, 725
F2d 1350,1360 (Fed Cir 1984).
75
Hybritech Inc v MonoclonalAntibodies,Inc, 802 F2d 1367, 1375 (Fed Cir 1986).
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that the patent examiner will unknowingly approve those terms.'
Moreover, the patent drafter is in a better position to know which
terms are critical to the scope of the patent than the patent examiner."
A rule that adopts the broadest possible interpretation provides the
patent drafter with incentives to leave those critical terms vague with

an eye toward extending the scope of the patent during later adjudication.7 8 While this extended scope may be limited by other doctrines,
such as the Markman analysis itself, this Comment specifically addresses cases in which the Markman analysis fails to determine which
definition is proper. Thus, relying solely on other doctrines of claim
construction to remove the incentive for patent drafters to use strategic ambiguity to expand the scope of their patents ex post likely would
fail. A rule that assumes the patent examiner is aware of all the critical

terms in the patent and knowingly adopts the broadest interpretation
during the examination period creates perverse incentives for patent
drafters." Rather than pursuing a course of clarity and good patent
drafting, the drafter will pursue a course of vagueness."

76 Patent drafters have incentives to be vague in the hope the Patent Office will "miss
something." Wagner, 151 U Pa L Rev at 215-16 (cited in note 66). The reason to push for broad
patent rights is that broad patent rights can create substantial monopoly power and bring capital
return in excess of the value of the invention. See Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of
Intellectual Property Law at 323 (cited in note 69) ("If [a] broad patent is granted, you may have
gotten yourself a very substantial monopoly.").
77 See Wagner, 151 U Pa L Rev at 213 (cited in note 66) ("Among the 'parties' to the patent transaction, the patentee is either the best informed or the one who can most easily and
cheaply become the best informed about the context of her innovation.").
78
See id at 214-15:

Given the asymmetry of information, the incentives for a patentee to fail to produce relevant information are substantial. Even assuming that an invalid patent would either be
"costless" because it remained unused, or eventually was struck down by a court, the presumption of validity and the high costs of patent litigation offer strong incentives for the
patentee to affirmatively avoid producing information relating to patent scope.
See also Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law at 324 (cited in
note 69) ("Broad interpretation of a patent's scope increases the patentee's power to exclude
competition.").
79 The patent drafter would be able to manipulate the procedural advantages of the patent
grant and the limited knowledge of the patent examiner to extract rents in excess of the merits of
the invention. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-ObtainingRules, 45 BC L Rev 55, 114 (2003) ("[Dleference to the Patent Office's
decisions on validity as being well-informed is questionable because the Patent Office is not the
lower cost provider of information relating to validity.").
80 See Wagner, 151 U Pa L Rev at 215-16 (cited in note 66):
[T]he patentee has both the motive and the opportunity to behave strategically.... It might
involve declining to conduct a thorough prior art search, thus transferring this cost to the
public as well as increasing the possibility that the [Patent Office] will "miss something" and
allow the unwarranted scope. Perhaps a patentee will draw inappropriately broad claims,
hoping that the prosecution process will only minimally (if at all) pare the claims back, thus
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If the Federal Circuit adopts a rule of narrow construction, how-

ever, patent drafters have a significant incentive to draft clearly8 ' and
to "particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention."" This clarity by the applicant will allow her to gain the broadest possible scope for her
claims during drafting, since any ambiguity will be construed against
her.° Patent drafters have an incentive to "be[come] their own lexicographers" and explicitly define the critical aspects of their invention.8' These incentives should cause the patent drafter to pursue a
course of clarity rather than one of vagueness to gain the greatest
statutory monopoly.8
Nonetheless, there are limits on patent drafters' ability to be ex-

plicit. Language is inherently ambiguous,Mand therefore increasing
the clarity of patent claims will be costly to the patent drafter as it increases the price of creating an effective patent. The patent system
should be concerned with the cost of drafting adequate patents because the higher the cost is, the lower the incentive to invent will be.8

yielding additional scope. Perhaps a patentee will vaguely describe her invention in the
claims or in order to introduce uncertainty about the scope of her patent.
81 See id at 217 ("[Plenalty-avoidance tactics might include ...defin[ing] terms in their
claims more clearly, so as to avoid costly misunderstandings with the PTO regarding their scope.
Alternatively, patentees might provide additional teachings in their patent document, thereby
providing support for the breadth of claims desired.").
82 35USC§ 112.
83
See Wagner, 151 U Pa L Rev at 218-19 (cited in note 66) ("[T]he penalty default rule
operates here to encourage crisp and considered drafting of both original and amended claims: in
original claims to avoid later amendments and in amended claims to minimize the potential loss
from imposition of the prosecution history estoppel penalty.").
84 See Texas Digital, 308 F3d at 1204 ("In short, the presumption in favor of a dictionary
definition will be overcome where the patentee, acting as his or her own lexicographer, has
clearly set forth an explicit definition of the term different from its ordinary meaning.") (emphasis added); Rexnord, 274 F3d at 1342 ("[Platent law permits the patentee to choose to be his or
her own lexicographer by clearly setting forth an explicit definition for a claim term that could
differ in scope from that which would be afforded by its ordinary meaning.") (emphasis added).
85 See Wagner, 151 U Pa L Rev at 220 (cited in note 66) ("[T]here are clear incentives
already in place to provide relevant information (if needed) during prosecution-the patent
would be rejected otherwise.") (emphasis added).
86 See Bender, 8 J Intel Prop L at 209 (cited in note 64) ("Often the invention is novel and
words do not exist to describe it.").
87 Higher costs in obtaining patents reduce their expected value to the inventor. Compare
Jay P. Kesan and Marc Banik, Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D
Investment with Incentives to Disclose PriorArt, 2 Wash U J L & Policy 23, 34 (2000) ("The expected value of the invention depends on the outcome of initial R&D efforts, the probability of
obtaining valuable property rights protecting the invention (a patent), and the probability of
successfully exploiting that property right (market success)."), with Wagner, 151 U Pa L Rev at
218 (cited in note 66) ("[Q]uestions of cost location beg the question of why the public should
subsidize the production of such information, especially when it appears that the prospective
patentee is in the best position to cheaply produce it.").
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III. PATENT DRAFTING AND THE MAGNITUDE OF ERROR COSTS

Patent drafting not only affects the quality of the patent itself, but
also plays a large role in determining the magnitude of error costs
when the scope of the patent is erroneously demarcated. Simply put,

different rules of interpretation encourage different patent drafting
tactics. Selection of the proper rule of interpretation must be made

with regard to drafting tactics, the inherent ambiguity of language, and
the factual circumstances of the dispute.
A.

Overlapping Definitions
In the context of overlapping definitions, the AAI court was cor-

rect, and the patent system should accept the narrow definition over

the broader definition as this rule will produce a more efficient patent
system. When the adverse party's definition is within the scope of the
patent holder's definition-that is, an overlapping definition-the patent holder is in the best position to reduce the harms of imperfect demarcation of patent scope." In this context, the inherent problems of
language are less compelling. The reduced scope of the patent is not
due to the inability of the patent drafter to adequately describe the
meaning of the patent, but rather the patent drafter's lack of explicit-

ness in claiming the broader meaning. The original drafting included
the broader interpretation; thus, words must have existed at the time
of the drafting to describe the broader invention. Therefore, it is more
likely that the reason for the vague language was by choice-that is,

the drafter believed that it was not worth the cost to be explicit.
The patent drafter is in a better position than the patent examiner to define the patent's proper scope since the patent drafter has
is also in a
greater awareness of the critical terms.9 The patent drafter
In the context of

superior position compared to any second mover.

88 See Ayres and Gertner, 101 Yale L J at 732 (cited in note 63) ("When even slight costs in
contracting around a default rule are introduced, however, the choice of default rule can affect
both the contractual equilibrium and the net social benefits of contracting, i.e., efficiency.").
89 See Kesan and Banik, 2 Wash U J L & Policy at 53 (cited in note 87) ("This is consonant
with a body of contracting literature that proposes that when parties are asymmetrically informed, default rules that penalize the more informed party will be welfare enhancing by inducing that party to reveal information.").
90 Such a default rule can be seen as a penalty default rule, and can be useful for forcing
parties to perform socially beneficial actions. See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87,91 (1989):

Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision
they prefer. In contrast to the received wisdom, penalty defaults are purposefully set at
what the parties would not want-in order to encourage the parties to reveal information
to each other or to third parties (especially the courts).
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overlapping definitions, the costs associated with inventing around the
first mover or accidental infringement are reduced when the patent
drafter is explicit. The reduced uncertainty in the scope of the patent
through explicit drafting reduces the likelihood of unintentional infringement, which should in turn increase investment in developing
noninfringing technologies.
Moreover, explicit definitions reduce the possibility that the second mover will engage in wasteful "definition creation." That is, the
second mover is less likely to try to develop, ex post, definitions that
satisfy Markman but do not include their product. Such expenditures
are wasteful because they have some positive cost and no offsetting
social value.9 In the context of competing overlapping definitions, the
cost of erroneously demarcating the patent's scope is reduced when
the onus is placed on the patent drafter to be explicit due to the patent drafter's unique role in the patent system.2
The inherent difficulty with overlapping definitions is ambiguity
in language. Two existing bodies of law, contract law and the doctrine
of equivalents, both struggle with the limitations of language and can
shed light on the best construction of language.
1. Contract law's construction against the drafter.
The manner in which contract law resolves interpretive problems
with ambiguous contract terms is analogous to the interpretive issues
of ambiguous terms in patent claims. In contract interpretation the
Supreme Court has held that "a contract should be construed most
strongly againstthe drafter."3 The Supreme Court, in accordance with

common law courts and academic commentators, has adopted a rule
of construction against the drafter as the least-cost alternative. The
same principles that guided the Supreme Court in contract interpretation also apply in patent claim construction. When the drafter is in the
best position to defend against ambiguous terms, placing the onus on
the drafter to be explicit provides for the most efficient result.

91 Ex post definition creation lacks value because the activity seeks only to deny the proper
scope of the patent.
92 See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation,14 Harv J L & Tech 1,80 (2000)
("If the claim is ambiguous in that it is subject to at least two reasonable constructions, the judge
may be well-advised to ...adopt the construction that is less favorable to the party that drafted
the language.").
93 United States v Seckinger, 397 US 203,210 (1970) (emphasis added).
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The doctrine of equivalents' justified expansion of scope.

While the arguments presented above seem to suggest that the

drafter should always bear the risk of ambiguity, the patent system
might justifiably enlarge the scope of a patent in some instances. The
patent system performs this scope enlargement under the doctrine of
equivalents. When an adverse party's device is not within the literal
language of the patent, "a patentee may invoke [the doctrine of
equivalents] to proceed against the producer of a device 'if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain
the same results."'

This Comment specifically addresses the proper scope of the literal claim language. Nonetheless, the analysis for overlapping definitions applies with the same force to the doctrine of equivalents. In the
Supreme Court's most recent explanation of the doctrine, the Court
emphasized the need for the proper determination of the scope of the
literal claim language.9 The Court found that the doctrine of equivalents should increase the scope of the patent, in certain circumstances,
of the patent claims.9
by providing equivalents of the literal elements
This rule is known as the "all elements rule," and requires that any
equivalent of a patent element be linked to the literal claim language.'
Thus, in order to correctly apply the doctrine of equivalents, the determination of the proper scope of the literal claim language is necessary. Although the result may be similar, courts should not enlarge the
scope of the patent under the guise of interpreting the literal language,
but instead should rely on the doctrine of equivalents where the ap-

94 Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co, Inc v Linde Air Products Co, 339 US 605,608 (1950),
quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co v Winters, 280 US 30, 42 (1942) (limiting the breadth of the
"means" in means-plus-function claims to the "corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof' in accordance with 35 USC § 112).
95 See Warner-JenkinsonCo, Inc v Hilton Davis Chemical Co, 520 US 17,29 (1997):
There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts
with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement....
Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the
patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to
effectively eliminate that element in its entirety.

96 Id. For example, the application of the doctrine of equivalents is most convincing in
situations where (a) the feature distinguishing the adverse party's invention from the literal
claim language could not have been reasonably foreseen by the patent drafter, and (b) had the
distinguishing feature been reasonably foreseeable, the patent drafter would have included the
feature in the drafting language. In such circumstances, the patent drafter could not have protected herself by being explicit.
97 See id at 40 ("The determination of equivalence should be applied as an objective inquiry on an element-by-element basis.").
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propriate framework for enlarging patent scope can be faithfully followed.
B.

Nonoverlapping Definitions

In the context of nonoverlapping definitions, the Rexnord court
was correct: the proper scope of the patent includes the adoption of all
such nonoverlapping definitions. When the adverse party's definition
is not within the scope of the patent holder's definition-that is, a
nonoverlapping definition-placing the burden of ambiguity on the
adverse party provides for the most efficient result. Drafting a patent
is a single-game decision: the patent drafter drafts the patent only
once, and must make all her decisions based on all the rules of interpretation. The rule construing against the drafter for overlapping definitions mitigates any incentive to draft vaguely.
Developing plausible nonoverlapping definitions is socially wasteful and a costly proposition for both the patent drafter and the second
mover. Parties must expend significant sums to develop plausible
definitions, and this expenditure leads to no useful outcome. Value
spent gaming the system by producing alternative plausible definitions
does not further any goal of society, but only furthers the adverse
party's goal of avoiding the cost of infringement liability. Because it
may be in the interest of the adverse party to produce plausible
nonoverlapping definitions, the patent system should discourage this
socially wasteful practice by creating interpretive rules that close off
this litigation tactic.
In the context of nonoverlapping definitions, the patent drafter
will not necessarily be in a better position to defend against the strategic actions of the adverse party. First, the cost to the patent drafter
of developing definitions occurs ex ante, and occurs with every patent
regardless of whether that patent becomes valuable or not. Second,
the cost to the second mover will occur after the drafting, and thus
only when a patent is valuable.9' While a rule adopting all nonoverlapping definitions encourages the patent drafter to be vague in the
hopes that she can create nonoverlapping definitions ex post that will
98
One proxy for identifying the cost of developing plausible claim term definitions is the
cost of prosecuting a patent. See Lemley, 95 Nw U L Rev at 1508 (cited in note 71) (finding an
average cost of $20,000 per original application). Another proxy is the cost of litigating a patent.
See Mark A. Lemley and Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 Berkeley
Tech L J 1085, 1111 n 77 (2003) ("[T]he cost of patent litigation [in 2003] ... average[d] $2 million where $1-25 million was at stake in the case, and nearly $4 million where more than $25
million was at stake."), citing American Intellectual Property Law Association, 2003 Report of
the Economic Survey 22 (2003).
99 If the patent were not valuable, neither party would be concerned with infringement.
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include a second mover's product,'" a rule denying the patent drafter

nonoverlapping definitions provides the adverse party with incentives
to develop new nonoverlapping definitions that deny the patent its
appropriate scope. The inherent limits of language allow new definitions to be created ex post when such definitions were not within the
patent drafter's consideration ex ante."' In this context, the patent
drafter is not in a better position to protect against the associated
costs of improper demarcation of patents as compared to either the
patent examiner or the second mover, simply because the patent

holder is not in a better position to imagine definitions that might be
later invented.' A rule denying nonoverlapping definitions that come

within the scope of the patent will force the patent drafter to expend
the costs of developing all nonoverlapping definitions ex ante for
every patent claim, whereas the adverse party will have such costs
only when the patents are valuable. Moreover, the patent drafter already has incentives to be explicit, in tho context of overlapping definitions, where the patent drafter is the least-cost avoider.' A patent

drafter will not engage in a strategy of ambiguity to gain more
nonoverlapping definitions, which may or may not exist, only to lose
overlapping definitions that the patent drafter already knows and understands how to properly include within the scope of the patent.
Including all nonoverlapping definitions within the scope of the
patent reduces the total social waste of imperfect demarcation of patent scope. First, the patent drafter already has incentives to be clear
and explicit to avoid forfeiting any overlapping definitions. Second,
the patent drafter is not in a better position than the second mover to
reduce the cost of erroneously demarcating the scope of the patent
due to the improper inclusion or exclusion of nonoverlapping definitions.'° Finally, the patent drafter would have to engage in the costly
100 See Wagner, 151 U Pa L Rev at 215-16 (cited in note 66) (discussing a patentee's incentive to draft inappropriately broad claims in hopes of gaining additional scope, presumably to
include the invention of any second mover).
101 See Bender, 8 J Intel Prop L at 209 (cited in note 64).
102 See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 128 (cited in note 90):
Since the goal of a penalty default is to induce information revelation, lawmakers should
consider the likelihood that the penalty will in fact result in information being revealed, the
benefit (in more efficient reliance or precaution) of the revealed information, and the costs
of explicitly contracting around the default. If the private information is acquired with economic resources, the value of information revelation must also be weighed against the private incentives to acquire it. Penalty defaults are therefore more likely to be efficient if the
private information is acquired passively. In sum, a penalty default should be used if it results in valuable information revelation with low transaction costs.
103 See Part III.A.
104 Penalty default rules are only beneficial when the information can be produced efficiently. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 128 (cited in note 90). See also text accompanying
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effort of determining and developing all possible nonoverlapping definitions in each patent drafted, whereas the second mover will only
have to expend this cost ex post once the patent is determined to be
valuable. In light of all the incentives for first and second movers, the
efficient outcome is obtained when the scope of the patent includes all

nonoverlapping definitions, and those definitions satisfy the full extent
of the Markman analysis.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of the incentives of each interpretive rule demonstrates that the AAI and Rexnord rules of construction used in con-

junction, but under different circumstances, produce a more efficient
patent system. In working to reconcile the seemingly opposing rules of
construction, this Comment shows that when used in the appropriate
context, the two rules reduce the cost of erroneously demarcating the
scope of the patent.

note 102. In the context of nonoverlapping definitions, such information is not cheaply produced.
See Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U Chi L Rev 151,177 (2004)
("[T]he difficulty the applicant faced in crafting appropriate claim language up front, and the
room that was left for reasonable disagreements between applicant and examiner[,] suggest that
[doing better] would have been prohibitively expensive."). Lichtman is referring to drafting a
claim up front that covers all the definitions that a patentee might eventually receive under the
doctrine of equivalents, but the analysis works equally well for attempting to draft a claim that
covers all alternative, nonoverlapping definitions.

